The Heavyweight Bout of the Century -- Purdy versus Chavez

The battle royale is now set over the question of whether the vocational expert must have some logical defense of the job numbers regurgitated at a Social Security hearing.  In the blue corner, we have the Seventh Circuit on-demand rule culminating in Chavez v. Berryhill.  In the red corner, we have the rest of the country typified by the approach announced in Purdy v. Berryhill.

Purdy is simple.  The vocational expert identified job numbers using Job Browser Pro.  Counsel for Purdy asked the VE how JBP worked.  The VE didn't really know but claimed that it was generally accepted.  The SkillTran team puts out a generally reliable product.  Some of the industry codes are suspect, but the methodology is sound in using industry designations to winnow down job numbers.  Purdy's conclusion:

This is not to say that we could go to the extreme of approving reliance on evidence of the software numbers offered by a witness who could say nothing more about them than the name of the software that produced them. But that is not the case here. The VE, whose qualifications Purdy did not challenge, testified that the job numbers were from the Bureau of Labor Statistics and were stated in reference to job descriptions in the DOT; that is, they were specific to jobs, not to broad amalgams of jobs, some of which an applicant might be able to perform but not others. The VE testified that the software's conclusions on the described basis were generally accepted by those who are asked to give the sort of opinions sought here. She testified, in other words, to a reliable and practical basis of fact on which analysis was performed, and to a wide reputation for reliability.

Naming the software is not enough.  Knowing the source (BLS) of job numbers; that JBP stated DOT-specific job numbers not entire OES-SOC groups of job numbers; and the generally accepted nature of JBP in combination are sufficient.  What is missing from the Purdy presentation is any evidence that JBP was wrong about any of its job number conclusions.

Chavez set the stage as a fight between JBP and the Occupational Employment Quarterly.  Chavez does not disagree with the factors outlined in Purdy:

Establishing the reliability of a job-number estimate does not require meeting an overly exacting standard. Many variables combine to create uncertainty in a VE's job-number estimate.
...

VEs are neither required nor expected to administer their own surveys of employers to obtain a precise count of the number of positions that exist at a moment in time for a specific job. Think of the difficulty, if not impossibility, of acquiring the data necessary to tally how many residential laundry worker jobs exist throughout the United States or even in the Midwest. The VE necessarily must approximate, and there is no way to avoid uncertainty in doing so.

After discussing previous encounters with the equal-distribution method, Chavez highlights the problem with the vocational expert's testimony in this case:

And all the record shows is that the VE preferred the job-number estimates produced by the equal distribution method over those from the occupational density method. What is entirely lacking is any testimony from the VE explaining why he had a reasonable degree of confidence in his estimates. The VE, for example, could have drawn on his past experience with the equal distribution method, knowledge of national or local job markets, or practical learning from assisting people with locating jobs throughout the region, to offer an informed view on the reasonableness of his estimates. The absence of any such testimony left the ALJ without any reasoned and principled basis for accepting the job-number estimates.

Whereas the VE in Purdy stated reliance and general confidence in JBP, the VE in Chavez rejected JBP as reporting too small of numbers and just a blanket preference for the equal distribution method used in the OEQ.  The VE did not knowing the source of job numbers; could not state that the job numbers were DOT-specific; and could not or did not state that the OEQ was generally accepted as a reasonable estimate of job numbers.

Are Chavez and Purdy in conflict?  I don't think so.  They are factually distinct.  Purdy could truthfully rely on the accepted nature of JBP as an occupational density model for reporting job numbers by DOT code, it does.  Chavez could not truthfully state that VE's believe that the OEQ constitutes a reasonable basis for reporting job numbers by DOT code, it doesn't.   The 2017 Vocational Expert Handbook requires the defense described in Chavez and Purdy:

You should be prepared to explain why your sources are reliable.

NOTE: During your testimony, maintain easy access to any sources you rely upon, as the ALJ, claimant, or representative may have questions about your sources. Particularly, any sources outside of those listed under 20 CFR 404.1566(d) and 416.966(d).

See page 38.  Absent a reasonable statement of reliability of methodology, the testimony is not substantial evidence under either Chavez or Purdy.  In the next few posts, we will talk about questions to ask the VE on cross about the OEQ and JBP to bolster the rejection of the OEQ or disassemble reliance on JBP in some cases.

We close today with the observation in Chavez:

We also recognize and underscore that VEs cannot be expected to formulate opinions with more confidence than imperfect data allows. Nor is it our place to enjoin use of the equal distribution method. What we do require, though, is more than what supported the ALJ's decision here.

The COSS should tell her ALJs to stop accepting testimony based on the equal distribution method.