Logical and Rational Articulations under the 404.1520c and 416.920c are Still Necessary

 I work through problems.  Some ALJs and courts seem to think that not only did the Commissioner remove the treating physician rule but also stripped out the need to articulate why the ALJ rejected probative evidence.  This is an analysis that starts with Supreme Court authority and uses Ninth Circuit precedent to flesh out the contours.  Out of the Ninth Circuit, attorneys should use other appropriate cases.  These are fact sensitive cases.  A long and healthy discussion of the facts is critical, fill in the blanks!  Enjoy.  

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As a matter of administrative law, the agency must explain the decision from the facts found to the choices made.  Motor Vehicle Manufacturers Ass'n of the United States, Inc. v. State Farm Mutual Automobile Insurance Co., 463 U.S. 29, 52 (1983).  The “scope of review is ‘narrow’: [the court must] determine only whether the Secretary examined ‘the relevant data’ and articulated ‘a satisfactory explanation’ for his decision, ‘including a rational connection between the facts found and the choice made.’”  Dept. of Commerce v. New York, 139 S.Ct. 2551, 2569 (2019) (citing Motor Vehicle Manufacturers Ass’n).  The law of the circuit has long required that the ALJ explain why she rejected probative medical evidence.  Vincent on Behalf of Vincent v. Heckler, 739 F.2d 1393, 1394 (9th Cir. 1984).   The hierarchy established in Murray v. Heckler, 722 F.2d 499, 502 (9th Cir. 1983) and exemplified in Lester v. Chater, 81 F.3d 821, 830–31 (9th Cir. 1995) placed a framework that the Commissioner adopted in the interim.  The rejection of the hierarchy in the current and applicable regulations does not relieve the ALJ of the duty to explain the decision.  Connett v. Barnhart, 340 F.3d 871, 874 (9th Cir. 2003) (“We are constrained to review the reasons the ALJ asserts.”).  Administrative agencies must always explain their decisions. 

The question here is why the ALJ rejected the limitation to [ … ].  Brown-Hunter v. Colvin, 806 F.3d 487, 494 (9th Cir. 2015).  The ALJ did not give a logical or rational reason for rejecting [ … ] evidence.  The ALJ’s statements explaining the decision must rest on a logical foundation and be rational.  Allentown Mack Sales & Serv., Inc. v. NLRB, 522 U.S. 359, 374 (1998) (“Not only must an agency's decreed result be within the scope of its lawful authority, but the process by which it reaches that result must be logical and rational.”). 

The record discloses [ what the evidence source says, what the evidence shows ].  The record discloses what the ALJ found [ describe ].  What the record does not disclose is why the ALJ rejected the probative evidence provided by [ name the source]. 

The ALJ did not find a limitation to [ … ] unsupported or inconsistent with the record.  The [medically determinable impairment] alone justifies a limitation to/from [what the source said]. [cite].  [analysis].  [conclusion].  The ALJ did not provide a decision that permits meaningful review of the reasons for rejecting that opinion evidence under Connett, Brown-Hunter, and Vincent.  The ALJ considered the evidence and decided.  But that is not enough.  Hu v. Holder, 652 F.3d 1011, 1020 (9th Cir. 2011) (remanding where a meaningful review of the agency’s decision could not be conducted because the agency failed to provide a reasoned explanation of its decision).  

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Suggested Citation:

Lawrence Rohlfing, Logical and Rational Articulations under the 404.1520c and 416.920c are Still Necessary, California Social Security Attorney (May 23, 2021)  https://californiasocialsecurityattorney.blogspot.com/2021/05/logical-and-rational-articulations.html

Do the 2017 Regulations Relieve the ALJ of Explaining the Rejection of Opinion Evidence?

The question of whether the new regulations relieve the ALJ of the burden of articulating specific and legitimate reasons to rejected a contradicted opinion or clear and convincing reasons for rejecting an uncontradicted opinion rests on the question of whether the Ninth Circuit would abandon its precedent and yield to the regulations.  See Lester v. Chater, 81 F.3d 821, 830–31 (9th Cir. 1995); Murray v. Heckler, 722 F.2d 499, 501-02 (9th Cir. 1983).  Murray imposed the “treating physician rule” in the absence of a regulation.  The Commissioner cannot relieve himself of the burden of articulating why he has rejected probative evidence.  Vincent v. Heckler, 739 F.2d 1393, 1395 (9th Cir. 1984).  That standard applies to all forms of probative evidence.  Flores v. Shalala, 49 F.3d 562, 570-71 (9th Cir. 1995) (ALJ acted without substantial justification in rejecting a report of vocational testing showing education level).   

The courts review the reasons that ALJs articulate for rejecting probative evidence.  Connett v. Barnhart, 340 F.3d 871, 874 (9th Cir. 2003) (“We are constrained to review the reasons the ALJ asserts.”)  The need for reasons exists at the individual case decision level and on the macro level of articulating policy.  Dept. of Homeland Security v. Regents of the Univ. of Cal., 140 S.Ct. 1891, 1908 (2020) (the Court does not rely on post hoc rationalizations for the defense of the administrative decision).  Every administrative agency must explain the connection between the evidence and the conclusion.  Dept. of Commerce v. New York, 139 S.Ct. 2551, 2569 (2019).  The Commissioner cannot by regulatory fiat discharge the broad administrative law obligations for an ALJ to explain the decision made.  Arbitrators are not required to give reasons by law.  Juries are not required to explain their decision absent special verdicts.  But judges at all levels must explain their decisions to permit review of not only the decision made but the reasons for that decision.  The need for reasons persists despite the regulatory changes that the Commissioner characterizes as lifting that burden off the ALJ.  

Administrative law jurisprudence requires that the agency explain itself.  That duty exists in the absence of a regulation requiring articulation.  The question of whether a regulation could erase the burden of articulation turns back to the point of deference.  The courts decide what constitutes substantial evidence on review.  That an ALJ does not have a burden of articulation for agency purposes does not mean that the courts cannot or should not require a full-throated explanation of why the evidence was given less weight or rejected.  From this perspective, SSA attempts to diminish the articulation standards for rejecting evidence should fail.  

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Suggested Citation:

Lawrence Rohlfing, Do the 2017 Regulations Relieve the ALJ of Explaining the Rejection of Opinion Evidence?, California Social Security Attorney (February 17, 2021) https://californiasocialsecurityattorney.blogspot.com/2021/02/do-2017-regulations-relieve-alj-of.html