Lambert v. Saul - The Continuing Presumption Died or Continues?

 Continuing to slug through the published Ninth Circuit cases decided in the Andrew Saul tenure, we turn to Lambert v. Saul.  

Lambert v. Saul, 980 F.3d 1266 (2020) -- SSA granted Lambert a period of disability and disability insurance benefits beginning in June 2005. SSA found that disability ended on January 1, 2015. There are two issues:

    1. The ALJ failed to identify the testimony rejected by specific reasons. Non-specific reasons do not meet the standard. The Court reversed and remanded. This holding is consistent with longstanding law of the circuit set forth in Holohan v. Massanari, 246 F.3d 1195, 1208 (9th Cir. 2001) and Brown-Hunter v. Colvin, 806 F.3d 487, 493 (9th Cir. 2015). That is not the reason the case was published. 

    2. Lambert addresses the continuing presumption of disability from the finding in 2005 to the cessation in 2015. The continuing presumption of disability arose in Patti v. Schweiker, 669 F.2d 582 (9th Cir. 1982). The continuing presumption was popular in the circuits. Rush v. Sec’y of Health & Human Servs., 738 F.2d 909, 914–15 (8th Cir. 1984); Dotson v. Schweiker, 719 F.2d 80, 82 (4th Cir. 1983); Kuzmin v. Schweiker, 714 F.2d 1233, 1237 (3d Cir. 1983); Simpson v. Schweiker, 691 F.2d 966, 969 (11th Cir. 1982); Rivas v. Weinberger, 475 F.2d 255 (5th Cir. 1973); Hall v. Celebrezze, 314 F.2d 686, 688 (6th Cir. 1963). The Ninth Circuit affirmed the continuing presumption of disability as a feature of the administrative jurisprudence in Bellamy v. Secretary of Health & Human Services, 755 F.2d 1380 (9th Cir. 1985).

The 1984 reform act made changes to the statute. SSA prmulgated regulation in 1985. Warren v. Bowen, 804 F.2d 1120 (9th Cir. 1986) (per curiam), amended on denial of reh’g, 817 F.2d 63 (9th Cir. 1987) and W.C. v. Bowen, 807 F.2d 1502 (9th Cir. 1987) amended on denial of reh’g, 819 F.2d 237 (9th Cir. 1987) muddied the legal waters casting doubt on the continuing presumption. 

Lambert held that none of the cases decided after Patti had considered teh 1984 Reform Act or the regulations. Lambert then applied Nat’l Cable & Telecomms. Ass’n v. Brand X Internet Servs., 545 U.S. 967 (2005) to strip the law of the circuit from the continuing presumption in Patti. 

Patti gave rise to Lyle v. Sec'y of HHS, 700 F.2d 566, 568 (9th Cir. 1983). Lyle is the continuing presumption on non-disability:

While Patti involved a prior determination that a claimant was disabled, we believe that its logic should be extended to situations where the claimant has previously been determined not to be disabled.

SSA turned the shield of a continuing presumption of disability recognized in Patti into the sword to decapitate a later claim in Lyle. Turnabout is fair play, the claimants turned that sword into a plow in Chavez v. Bowen, 844 F.2d 691, 693 (9th Cir. 1988). Prior findings plus an advancement of age category did not permit the agency to re-evaluate residual functional capacity or the ability to engage in past work to deny the claim in the older age category. SSA issued Acquiescence Rule 97-4(9) to cabin Chavez to the geographic confines of the Ninth Circuit. 

How is Chavez applied today? The Patti shield, the Lyle sword, and the Chavez plow are used to deny claimants an opportunity to get a second look at the claim for a different time period as a matter of administrative application of circuit precedent. SSA explains the de novo look at a different time period as agency policy. 

Chavez relies on Lyle which is based on an extension of Patti. Lambert overrules Patti in light of the 1984 Reform Act and the 1985 regulations. Because Patti cannot claim law of the circuit status, the underpinnings of Lyle in creating the continuing presumption of non-disability gets buried in the same grave. The death of Patti and Lyle infects Chavez and it gets thrown into the same pit. It is time to cover that grave with the top soil of Brand X deference. 

Getting rid of Lyle and Chavez would give claimants the de novo view of a subsequent time period that hte agency claims is policy. It would end the litigation over subsequent claims casting doubt on cases pending in the courts. See Luna v. Astrue, 623 F.3d 1032 (9th Cir. 2010). That would simplify the work of the court system and restore (gag) administrative discretion. 

Lambert should have broad ramifications on the administrative law jurisprudence beyond the continuing presumption of disability. That doctrine percolates in other parts of hte administrative law cases. The courts should liberally apply Lambert. 

Convince me that I am wrong. 

___________________________

Suggested Citation:

Lawrence Rohlfing, Lambert v. Saul - The Continuing Presumption Died or Continues?, California Social Security Attorney (April 29, 2023) https://californiasocialsecurityattorney.blogspot.com

The author has been AV-rated since 2000 and listed in Super Lawyers since 2008.